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Introduction 
 
 
“Deoligarchisation” in Ukraine 
Promising Visions, Murky Realities 
Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart 
In 2015, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced a process of “deoligarchisa-
tion”. Not much has happened so far. Some of the oligarchs’ profit sources have run 
dry in the field of public procurement. Certain efforts have been made to curb the in-
fluence of oligarchs with respect to media legislation and financing political parties. 
However, these reforms have not yet been implemented effectively. In addition, meas-
ures in sectors that are fundamentally important to the oligarchs (the energy sector, 
in particular) have been extremely contradictory. As a result, the oligarchic system per-
sists and is being supported and consolidated by the ruling elite. Unless external actors 
increase their influence, Ukraine is unlikely to free itself from the mire of corruption, 
despite its many reform endeavours. 
 
The Maidan protest movement that brought 
about the 2014 overthrow of President Viktor 
Yanukovych called for the oligarchs’ influ-
ence on the politics and economy of Ukraine 
to be curtailed. Even President Poroshenko 
declared that, in the fight against corruption, 
“deoligarchisation” would be given top 
priority. However, unlike after the Orange 
Revolution of 2004, this process was to be 
‘evolutionary’ and without the need for 
nationalisation or reprivatisation. Instead, 
the intention was to destroy existing mo-
nopolies, strengthen state control in the 
resource sector and reduce the political 
influence of the oligarchs. However, there 
are questions as to whether this process is 
actually taking place, especially since the 
President himself is an industrialist and 
arguably ranks among the oligarchs. 
Political influence of the oligarchs 
Oligarchs in Ukraine are business magnates 
who have had considerable influence on 
the country’s politics since at least the end 
of the 1990s. They employ various means, 
but always with the primary aim of cham-
pioning their own business interests. The 
considerable financial resources of the oli-
garchs are the result, but also the basis of 
their political activity. Generally, oligarchs 
employ three strategies of political activity: 
Informal (corruption) networks between 
oligarchs and the political elite, with the 
former securing economic profits and, in 
return, the latter providing political sup-
port, constitute the basis of their influence. 
These networks or cliques are found in all 
organs and institutions of the state – in par-
liament, but also in bureaucratic agencies, 
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such as the Customs Office or the Anti-
Monopoly Committee. Furthermore, oli-
garchs in Ukraine frequently take on politi-
cal office themselves. This not only consoli-
dates their political relationships but also 
makes them immune from prosecution. 
The third way oligarchs in Ukraine exert 
political influence is through the media. 
Oligarchs have controlled the country’s 
most important mainstream media for years 
– especially the key medium of television. 
Particularly in the context of elections, tele-
vision gives oligarchs plenty of opportunity 
to garner support for their own political 
projects or political allies and weaken the 
opposition. In order to diversify and max-
imise their influence, they sometimes sup-
port multiple parties simultaneously. 
Since the oligarchs in Ukraine compete 
against each other, their past political activ-
ities have tended to counteract any trends 
toward autocratic development. As a result, 
they also contribute to a certain political 
and media pluralism in the country. Never-
theless, their presence in the political 
system remains a formidable obstacle to 
Ukraine’s democratisation. Firstly, they use 
their considerable financial resources to 
distort conditions between the actors in 
political competition. Secondly, they ma-
nipulate the process of shaping policies for 
their own benefit. And thirdly, they pro-
mote practices that are harmful to democ-
racy, such as corruption and clientelism. 
The symbiosis between politics and 
business promoted or personified by the 
oligarchs also has a massive economic 
impact because the oligarchs will usually 
only push through those economic reforms 
that maximise their incomes. In the past, 
this was particularly evident when it came 
to issues of privatisation or legal changes 
in the area of public procurement, govern-
ment subsidies or energy trading. More-
over, monopolies created by the oligarchs 
in certain sectors of the economy further 
hamper the development of small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Ultimately, 
the dominance of the oligarchs and their 
economic competitive advantages, coupled 
with a lack of legal certainty and strikingly 
high levels of corruption, all have a nega-
tive effect on the willingness of foreigners 
to invest in Ukraine. 
The oligarchs after Maidan 
The political and economic crisis that befell 
Ukraine during the Maidan protests placed 
the oligarchs under intense pressure. Al-
most all of the nearly two dozen oligarchs 
lost considerable sums of money in the 
deep recession. Possibly the best example is 
the wealthiest member of the group, Rinat 
Akhmetov. It is estimated that his fortune 
shrank from US$12.5 billion in 2014 to 
US$2.3 billion currently. The number of 
Ukrainian billionaires has also halved since 
2014 from ten to five. Only President Poro-
shenko has managed to increase his assets. 
The value of his company holdings increased 
by an estimated US$100 million last year. 
In particular, those oligarchs with a 
close relationship to Yanukovych suffered 
an enormous loss of power. Their influence 
also decreased due to the collapse of the 
‘Party of Regions’. Serhiy Kurchenko, whose 
rise only began under Yanukovych’s presi-
dency, is, however, the only oligarch against 
whom criminal investigations have been 
launched in Ukraine. His holding company 
was confiscated. Just like other members of 
Yanukovych’s innermost circle of power, he 
left the country after the fall of the regime, 
while Rinat Akhmetov managed to retain 
his oligarch status, even though he lost in-
fluence after the regime’s collapse. Firstly, 
Akhmetov has limited access to separatist 
areas of the Donbas controlled by Russia. 
Secondly, although he is still in control of 
part of the Opposition Bloc, the importance 
of this political force as the de facto succes-
sor of the Party of Regions – formerly the 
strongest parliamentary faction – declined 
dramatically after severe losses in the 2014 
elections. Akhmetov’s reduced influence 
in post-Maidan Ukraine was immediately 
noticeable in the energy sector. In the years 
prior to the elections, the company he con-
trolled, DTEK, became the largest private 
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electricity producer in the country. How-
ever, the National Energy and Utilities 
Regulatory Commission of Ukraine (NEURC), 
whose leadership was newly appointed 
under Poroshenko, decided to lower tariffs 
paid by the state for the purchase of elec-
tricity, which led to considerable losses for 
Akhmetov. 
Another oligarch, Dmytro Firtash, who 
was considered an important supporter of 
Yanukovych and beneficiary of the klepto-
cratic system, also lost power after the coup 
in 2014. For several years, Firtash profited 
from a monopoly on gas imports. He is also 
supposed to have received gas for his own 
companies from Russia under special con-
ditions and to have acted as a Kremlin 
stooge in Ukraine. After the change of gov-
ernment, he was initially arrested in 
Vienna on suspicion of corruption in the 
spring of 2014 at the request of a US court. 
He nevertheless continued to play a role in 
Ukrainian politics and business, apparently 
protected through informal agreements 
with Poroshenko and Vitali Klitschko (now 
the mayor of Kyiv). However, this did not 
prevent the Yatsenyuk government can-
celling leases on two metallurgical plants 
and confiscating 500 million cubic metres 
of natural gas from his holding company, 
Ostchem. 
The fall of Yanukovych and the ensuing 
marginalisation of his nepotistic clan, 
known as the ‘family’, created room for 
other cliques. Alongside Poroshenko, the 
oligarch Ihor Kolomoiskyi also gained a 
great deal of power. In March 2014, Kolo-
moiskyi was appointed governor of Dnipro-
petrovsk Oblast. He managed to ensure 
stability in the region bordering the Don-
bas. In the spring of 2015, however, a con-
flict surrounding his investments in the 
state oil and gas company Ukrnafta and 
in the pipeline company Ukrtransnafta 
escalated. Until then, it had been common 
practice for Kolomoiskyi to prevent a quor-
um at shareholders’ meetings by using his 
blocking minority – meaning that, among 
other things, dividend payments to the 
state had to be negotiated with him. But a 
new law put a stop to this practice. When 
the government removed Kolomoiskyi’s 
crony from the Executive Board of Ukr-
nafta, he tried to take over the company 
by force, but failed. He finally had to relin-
quish the post of governor in early 2015. 
The subsequent dismissal of Ihor Palytsia, 
one of Kolomoiskyi’s partners who had 
been governor of Odesa Oblast since May 
2014, was a clear sign of his loss of power. 
The port city of Odesa is considered an im-
portant transit point for smuggling, and 
Kolomoiskyi profited from this with the 
aid of the local customs office. 
The comeback of the oligarchs 
Despite the political dynamics described 
above and the temporary curtailing of the 
influence of some oligarchs, their role has 
hardly changed. This is evident from an 
examination of the current parliament, 
which has gained importance since Ukra-
ine’s return to the 2004 constitution and 
the re-introduction of a more parliamen-
tary-dominated system of government. 
Although today there are undoubtedly 
more reform-oriented members of parlia-
ment in the Verkhovna Rada than ever 
before, the oligarchs’ influence nonethe-
less remains undiminished. They recently 
managed to assert their influence even 
further, benefitting from the weakness 
of the ruling coalition, particularly in the 
wake of the government crisis in the spring 
of 2016. At the same time, however, Poro-
shenko also managed to gain additional 
power. 
Both trends were clearly confirmed with 
the appointment of Volodymyr Hroisman 
as Prime Minister. Hroisman is a long-time 
friend of the President. He previously served 
as the mayor of Vinnytsia, Poroshenko’s 
political home, before being elected into 
parliament on the party list of the pro-
presidential Petro Poroshenko Bloc and 
becoming Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. 
The dismissal of Yatsenyuk’s government 
and the appointment of Hroisman in April 
2016 marked a discernible shift in the bal-
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ance of power within the Ukrainian execu-
tive in favour of the President. The dualism 
that had existed between the President, on 
one hand, and Yatsenyuk representing the 
strongest parliamentary faction, on the 
other, disappeared. But because the govern-
ment coalition no longer had a majority 
due to the departure of the ‘Fatherland’ 
and ‘Self Reliance’ factions, the new cabinet 
was only elected thanks to votes from in-
dependent members of parliament and, 
in particular, the parliamentary groups 
‘People’s Will’ and ‘Revival’. Independent 
members of parliament with no direct man-
date are frequently considered to represent 
oligarchs’ interests in Ukraine. This also 
applies to both the parliamentary groups 
mentioned above. While the Revival group 
is said to be influenced by Kolomoiskyi, the 
People’s Will group consists mainly of for-
mer representatives of the Party of Regions, 
several of whom have connections to the 
state gas extraction company Ukrhazvydo-
buvannia. Yuriy Lutsenko, who was pre-
viously leader of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc 
and has no legal training, was ultimately 
appointed Prosecutor General of Ukraine 
with the votes of these parliamentary forces. 
The transition to a new government in 
conjunction with Yatsenyuk’s departure 
from the post of Prime Minister has seen 
more allowances made for the interests of 
the established oligarchs. For example, 
Akhmetov’s energy company DTEK recently 
recorded considerable profits again. These 
profits are only possible because on 1st 
March 2016 the NEURC raised the previously 
lowered tariff on the purchase of electricity 
by up to 20 percent. This increase was ac-
companied by a rise of 25 percent in elec-
tricity prices for Ukrainian consumers. 
Moreover, the NEURC allowed electricity 
suppliers to raise their tariffs by up to three 
percent per month from January 2017. The 
price of coal was also recalculated in Akh-
metov’s favour and he controls large seg-
ments of the Ukrainian coal mining indus-
try. The price is now based on the Rotter-
dam Coal Futures index, whereby fictitious 
delivery costs from Rotterdam to Ukraine 
are added for energy sources mined locally. 
Also, the pressure on Kolomoiskyi has eased 
visibly in recent months. The National Bank 
of Ukraine agreed to reschedule debts owed 
by PrivatBank, which is the country’s largest 
financial institution and part of Kolomois-
kyi’s Privat Group. Instead of insisting on a 
repayment of €641 million that was origi-
nally due in March 2016, the National Bank 
accepted a payment of only €22.6 million 
in April. Since 35 percent of deposits at 
PrivatBank are owned by Ukrainian citi-
zens, Kolomoiskyi could potentially cause 
the Ukrainian banking system to collapse if 
his bank defaulted. In addition, the restruc-
turing of Ukrnafta, a company he previously 
owned, is still not complete. Although the 
legal change to shareholder quorums men-
tioned above has allowed the state to regain 
control over the oil and gas company, 
newly appointed CEO Mark Rollins named 
Kolomoiskyi’s cronies to important key 
posts. Other people in Kolomoiskyi’s close 
circle have merely changed their positions 
rather than leaving the company. 
Poroshenko’s patronage network 
The government crisis that began with the 
resignation of the progressive Minister of 
Economic Development and Trade Aivaras 
Abromavičius in February 2016 has ulti-
mately raised questions about the role of 
President Poroshenko and his circle. With 
support from civil society and from abroad, 
Abromavičius had pushed for the reform 
of public procurement and set up an elec-
tronic platform called ProZorro aimed at 
improving the transparency of the process 
for awarding public contracts. However, 
Abromavičius tendered his resignation in 
February 2016 on the grounds that people 
from the President’s inner circle had pres-
sured him and tried to exert direct influ-
ence on the ministry. His accusations were 
directed explicitly at member of parliament 
Ihor Kononenko, deputy head of the Petro 
Poroshenko Bloc. Kononenko is a long-time 
business partner of the President and is 
often referred to as a key link between par-
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liament, the Prosecutor General’s Office and 
the Cabinet of Ministers. He is said to con-
trol a number of state-owned companies 
through a network of front men. Among 
other firms, this is supposed to include Zentr-
energo, which is responsible for supplying 
coal to other state enterprises and, under 
Yanukovych, favoured companies connec-
ted to his son Oleksandr. Today, Zentrener-
go’s state coal purchases are mainly handled 
through foreign companies whose owner-
ship structures are largely opaque. How-
ever, journalists in Ukraine have recently 
revealed that coal from contested areas in 
Donbas had officially been declared as hav-
ing originated in South Africa. This implies 
that Zentrenergo makes profits based on 
illegal transactions and false statements. 
After accusations by the former Minister 
of Economic Development and Trade, the 
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) 
opened investigations against Kononenko, 
suspecting him of abusing his office. How-
ever, it soon dropped these investigations 
due to a lack of evidence. Nevertheless, the 
allegations against Kononenko and other 
close friends of the President still stand. But 
Poroshenko is not only in trouble because 
of these dubious relationships. The publi-
cation of the ‘Panama Papers’ also raised 
questions as to whether the President him-
self is involved in offshore transactions and 
tax evasion. The political leadership lost 
further credibility recently due to an at-
tempt by the government to subordinate 
the state-owned company Ukrtranshaz, 
which controls the Ukrainian gas transit 
pipeline network, directly to the Ministry 
of Economic Development and Trade. Since 
the departure of Abramovičius and due to 
his accusations (see above), the ministry 
is widely suspected of being influenced 
by Poroshenko and his inner circle. Trans-
ferring Ukrtranshaz, a daughter company 
of Naftohaz, to the ministry would have 
undermined the promised “unbundling” 
of the energy sector, to which an indepen-
dently administered Ukrtranshaz is in-
tended to contribute.  
Parties and the media 
Some minor ‘deoligarchisation’ successes 
have been achieved in the areas of party 
financing and the media. The system of 
party funding is particularly significant for 
the political influence of oligarchs since the 
lack of legal frameworks currently makes 
Ukrainian political parties highly depend-
ent on contributions from individual donors. 
Furthermore, oligarchs have always been 
able to establish their own political forces. 
Recent examples of this include the Ukrain-
ian Union of Patriots (UKROP) and Vidro-
dzhennia (Revival), both of which are con-
sidered Kolomoiskyi’s political technology 
projects and appeared in the course of local 
elections in 2015. Meanwhile, smaller and 
more reform-oriented parties have found it 
very difficult to compete with financially 
powerful parties. As a result, the Ukrainian 
political party landscape is marked by a high 
susceptibility to corruption, a lack of con-
solidation and enormous fragmentation. 
Legislation introducing state party 
financing which came into force on 1st July 
2016 should help redress this imbalance. It 
provides for parties to receive state funding 
depending on their election results. Initially, 
however, this only applies to parties elected 
into parliament in 2014 and to those that 
achieve at least two percent of the vote in 
subsequent elections. Furthermore, the 
legislation also regulates the type and scope 
of private donations to political parties. 
Monetary and in-kind donations by natural 
and legal persons may not exceed a certain 
amount. In addition, party and election 
funds are separated to prevent donations 
to the party being transferred to election 
budgets. Parties are also required to create 
detailed financial reports and undergo 
internal and – if participating in elections – 
external audits. Additionally, the National 
Agency for the Prevention of Corruption 
(NAPC) will publish full audit reports on 
the Internet in order to increase transpar-
ency. It remains to be seen how these legal 
provisions will be implemented in practice. 
Nevertheless, electoral law reform is still 
inadequate. For example, campaign fund-
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ing and political advertising during elec-
tions are insufficiently regulated, leaving 
them open to influence from the oligarchs. 
In addition, current electoral law has 
always favoured the oligarchs – not only 
because half of all parliamentary seats are 
distributed via direct mandate, but also 
because the electorate are not given any 
say in the composition of party lists. 
Given the importance of the media to 
the political influence of business mag-
nates, reform of media laws could ultimately 
help restrict the power of the oligarchs. 
This is one of the objectives of legislation 
which came into force in October 2015 
intended to increase the transparency of 
media ownership. It requires broadcasters 
to disclose their ownership structures in 
detail. Furthermore, companies and indi-
viduals registered in ‘offshore zones’ are 
not allowed to set up or operate broadcas-
ting companies in Ukraine. The revised 
legislation was expressly welcomed by the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom 
of the Media, Dunja Mijatovic. She pointed 
out that ensuring transparency and pre-
venting excessive concentration in the 
media sector are important prerequisites 
for freedom of expression and diversity of 
opinion. At the same time, however, there 
was criticism in Ukraine that violations of 
this law cannot be adequately sanctioned. 
Even more important than increased 
transparency in the media landscape is 
the establishment of a public service broad-
casting model similar to those found in 
Western Europe. Not only would this model 
represent a counterbalance to television 
broadcasters controlled by the oligarchs, it 
would also strengthen the independence of 
the media in general. Legislation on setting 
up public service broadcasting companies, 
which came into force in early 2015, en-
sures that existing state radio and television 
entities will be transformed into a public 
broadcasting company, which will be regis-
tered as a public limited company under 
state ownership. The highest controlling 
body is the supervisory board consisting 
of one member from each parliamentary 
faction or group and representatives of 
various NGOs. These civil society represen-
tatives are guaranteed a majority vote by 
law. At present, the reform is far from 
meeting its intended purpose of establish-
ing public service broadcasting as a real 
competitor to the commercial media sector 
controlled by the oligarchs. This is partly 
due to unresolved bureaucratic and legal 
issues surrounding the merger of existing 
state television and radio stations. In addi-
tion, broadcasting companies currently 
funded solely from state coffers are com-
plaining of financial problems. The Direc-
tor General of the National Television Com-
pany of Ukraine, Zurab Alasania, resigned 
recently, blaming political leaders for the 
lethargic implementation of the reforms, 
claiming they had little interest in estab-
lishing public service broadcasting that 
actually worked. 
Weakening the oligarchs 
Nearly three years after the Maidan, the 
symbiosis of politics and business is far 
from passé. Most of the oligarchs that have 
been politically active for an extended 
period have remained influential, albeit 
weakened by the country’s economic prob-
lems and unfavourable international con-
ditions. Newer players from Yanukovych’s 
‘family’, however, have lost considerable 
power. At the same time, others have begun 
their rise to the top. They are closely linked 
to today’s elite, especially to the President, 
who has managed to strengthen his posi-
tion in many areas. 
Ukraine has taken steps in important 
spheres, such as party financing and the 
media, that could limit the power of the 
oligarchs in future. However, these meas-
ures have not yet been fully implemented. 
In other domains, particularly the energy 
sector, developments are considerably more 
contradictory. Here, elite representatives 
claim they are meeting the demands of the 
international community, while the spirit 
of the agreements reached is thwarted by 
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numerous actions. The same is true of the 
fight against corruption. This means that 
existing oligarchic structures are being 
strengthened rather than weakened. In 
addition, old and new players are currently 
consolidating their positions in order to be 
well placed for the next round of privatisa-
tions, for example. In short, future ‘reform 
steps’ will be implemented by a thoroughly 
‘oligarchised’ elite and will therefore be 
largely undermined as a result. To avoid this 
happening, the EU and other actors should 
further develop and refine their current 
strategy, particularly with regard to condi-
tionality and cooperation with civil society. 
Both the EU and the IMF have significant 
influence on Ukraine because they provide 
the country with considerable funding. 
Moreover, Germany and France support the 
country politically through the Normandy 
format. However, the pressure exerted to 
date by these actors has clearly not been 
sufficient to substantially reduce the power 
of the oligarchs. New mechanisms should 
therefore be used to break the symbiosis of 
politics and business. The temporary pres-
ence of a number of competent members 
of government with foreign origins and 
experience (e.g. Minister of Finance Natalie 
Jaresko, Minister of Economic Development 
and Trade Aivaras Abromavičius and Deputy 
Minister of Internal Affairs Eka Zguladze) 
has shown that the impact of people who 
are familiar with other models of gover-
nance and are not trapped in Ukrainian 
power networks can be positive. Conse-
quently, the EU and the IMF should make 
further financial aid conditional on the 
willingness of the Ukrainian leadership 
to allow foreign influence in key areas. To 
achieve this, it would be useful to bring 
together representatives of various organi-
sations involved in the Ukrainian reform 
process, including the EU, the IMF, the 
OSCE, the Council of Europe and the Energy 
Community. Each actor could expand its 
activities in one or more areas in Ukraine 
depending on the content. 
One idea would be to set up international 
commissions to monitor the work of key 
Ukrainian institutions, such as the Customs 
Office, the Anti-Monopoly Committee, the 
State Fiscal Service, the State Property Fund, 
the Prosecutor General and the NEURC. 
These commissions should receive exten-
sive rights of access to oral and written 
communications and to the decision-making 
processes of these authorities. They would, 
however, merely be observing these pro-
cesses, not intervening in the decision-
making authority of Ukrainian entities. The 
commissions would report back to relevant 
international formats – to the EU-Ukraine 
Association Council, for example – with 
their findings and suggestions for more tar-
geted forms of conditionality. In the case of 
the EU, the existing advisory mission could 
be given an extended mandate and corre-
sponding budget to set up and operate such 
commissions. The OSCE could provide the 
Representative on Freedom of the Media 
with more support and accompany the pro-
cess of establishing a public service broad-
caster. The Energy Community could moni-
tor the ongoing NEURC reform, the trans-
parency and success of which are crucial for 
reducing oligarchic influence and corrup-
tion in the energy sphere. It is more diffi-
cult to exert external influence on parlia-
ment. Nevertheless, the OSCE Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) and the Council of Europe could 
urge the adoption of legislation providing 
for full proportional representation and 
open electoral lists and monitor the imple-
mentation of legislation on party financing. 
Finally, Western actors could put substan-
tially more pressure on Poroshenko to dis-
pose of his companies as promised. 
It will be paramount for the EU and IMF 
to agree to link their financial tranches to 
the establishment and satisfactory function-
ing of the proposed monitoring commis-
sions. Otherwise the Ukrainian elite will 
lack sufficient incentive to permit the 
required level of observation. Even though 
there are now some reform-oriented offi-
cials in almost every Ukrainian agency who 
would welcome additional external control, 
resistance to greater transparency and ob-
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jectivity is still significant among the top 
leadership. 
For all the areas mentioned, there are 
competent individuals and civil society 
structures in Ukraine that can support 
foreign observers with expertise and élan. 
In particular, these include the “Reanima-
tion Package of Reforms” initiative, which 
has already successfully pushed through 
important legislation with the help of 
reformist parliamentarians. In this context, 
specialised organisations can be consulted, 
for example ANTAC or Nashi Hroshi (Our 
Money) for the fight against corruption, 
Dixi Group for the energy sector, Detector 
Media for the media, OPORA and the Com-
mittee of Ukrainian Voters for party financ-
ing and electoral law. 
Developments to date have shown that 
without tougher external monitoring the 
oligarchs will further consolidate their 
positions and eventually torpedo genuine 
changes in the political system. Inter-
national insistence has already forced the 
Ukrainian leadership to take substantial 
steps towards fighting corruption and 
introducing economic reforms. Targeted 
initiatives from outside supported by civil 
society actors within Ukraine can signifi-
cantly increase the likelihood of a “deo-
ligarchisation” actually taking place. With-
out increased external pressure, the reforms 
will most likely fail in the medium term 
and a new wave of political and social 
unrest will ensue. 
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